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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND CASE HISTORY
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is pursuant to Utah
Code Ann, §78-2-2(3)(i) . This appeal is from summary judgments
entered in the Third Judicial District in favor of two of five
defendants named in plaintiff's Complaint,
were voluntarily dismissed.

Two other defendants

A Default Judgment was entered in

favor of plaintiff and against the fifth defendant.
Specifically, judgments were granted in favor of defendants National Housing and Finance Syndicate (National Housing)
and Badi Mahmood (Mahmood), upon their respective motions for
summary judgment.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether the trial court erred when it found

plaintiff's Motion For Leave to File Second Amended Complaint
moot, after granting defendant National Housing's summary
judgment motion.

Stated otherwise, the issue is whether the

trial court should have ruled on the Motion for Leave to File
Second Amended Complaint before ruling on the summary judgment

-1-

motion.
2.

Whether application of Utah Code Ann. §78-12-26(3),

the statute of limitations applicable to actions "for relief on
the ground of fraud or mistake", barred plaintiff's action.
3.

Whether Mahmood, based on his past business rela-

tionship with plaintiff and in view of the fact that he recommended that plaintiff retain Dennis Jackman to appraise the
property it was considering purchasing from National Housing,
owed a duty to plaintiff to disclose (a) the fact that he was
going to share in National Housing's profit on the sale, (b) that
he had provided Jackman with "comparable sales" data used in the
appraisal, (c) that he controlled the brokerage which acted as
National Housing's agent, and (d) that National Housing had purchased the property just days earlier for one-third the price
plaintiff was about to pay.
4.

Whether Mahmood, based on his capacity as a real

estate broker, owed a duty to plaintiff to make those same
disclosures.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. §61-2-11. Revocation or suspension of
license—Grounds.1

1

As it read from 1963 until 1983.
-2-

"The board or the commission . . . may suspend or revoke
any license issued under the provisions of this chapter at
any time where the licensee has by false or fraudulent representation obtained a license, or where the licensee in performing or attempting to perform any of the acts mentioned in
this chapter is found to be guilty of:
"(1) Making any substantial misrepresentation; or,

"(11) Failing to disclose, in the purchase of property
in the name of a broker or salesman, whether the purchase is
made for himself or itself or for an undisclosed principal.
"(12) Any other conduct whether of a similar or of a
different character from that hereinbefore specified which
constitutes dishonest dealing."
Utah Code Ann. §61-2-17.

Penalty for violation of

chapter.2
"(b) In case any person . . . shall have received any
sum of money or the equivalent thereto, as commission, compensation or profit by or in consequence of his violation, of
any provision of this act, such person . . . shall also be
liable to a penalty of not less than the amount of the sum of
money so received and not more than three times the sum so
received, as may be determined by the court, which penalty
may be sued for and recovered by any person aggrieved and for
his use and benefit, in any court of competent
jurisdiction."
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-1. Time for commencement of
actions generally.
"Civil actions may be commenced only within the periods
prescribed in this chapter, after the cause of action has
accrued, except in specific cases where a different limitation is prescribed by statute."
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-26 [subdivision (3)]. Within
three years.

2

As it read from 1951 until 1983.
-3-

"Within three years:

"(3) an action for relief on the ground of fraud or
mistake; except that the cause of action in such case
does not accrue until the discovery by the aggrieved
party of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake."
STATEMENT OF THE CASE3
On December 31, 1979, defendant National Housing and
Finance Syndicate purchased approximately 46 acres of unimproved
land from Golden Hills Land Corporation for $320,000.00.
23 3)

(R.

Golden Hills had purchased the property from Dorothy Kitt

on the same day it sold the property to National Housing.

(R.

231)
Just two days later, on January 2, 1980, National
Housing sold the same 46 acres of unimproved land to plaintiff
for $927,800.00.

(R. 229-230)

Associated Title Company acted as

escrow agent.
Plaintiff was first shown the property by defendant
Mahmood who had close connections with plaintiff.

(R. 239-240)

[He had performed numerous real property appraisals for plaintiff

3

One of plaintiff's contentions is that the trial court erred
in not hearing and deciding plaintiff's Motion For Leave To File
A Second Amended Complaint. Some of the facts discussed in the
following recitation of facts are not supported by the record but
are facts plaintiff believes it could have proven had it been
permitted to further amend its Complaint and complete discovery
before hearing on respondents1 summary judgment motions. Those
facts are indicated by closed brackets, thus: [].
-4-

in the past.] Prior to purchasing the property, plaintiff
retained Dale Jackman to appraise the property.

Jackman was rec-

ommended to plaintiff by defendant Mahmood and Mahmood provided
"market data" in his file to Jackman for use in preparing the
appraisal.

(R. 245)

The real estate broker for National Housing on the sale
to plaintiff was Bara Investment Associates.

(R. 238) Mahmood

was the principal broker for Bara Investment Associates.
(R. 237)

At time of closing on the sale from National Housing to

plaintiff, Bara received a sales commission of $4,588.00.
(R. 229)

Additionally, National Housing gave Mahmood 40% of the

profit realized by it on the sale, approximately $200,000.00.
(R. 242)

In turn, Mahmood gave one-half of what he received to

Galen Ross, an officer of National Housing.

(R. 24 3)

[Despite the fact that he knew plaintiff had frequently
relied on him in the past to appraise properties, Mahmood did not
disclose to plaintiff the closely contemporaneous sales of the
property; nor that National Housing had purchased the property
just two days earlier for one-third the sales price.

Nor did

Mahmood disclose to plaintiff that he had the controlling interest in the broker who represented National Housing.

Nor did

Mahmood disclose to plaintiff that he had an "interest" in the
property by virtue of the fact that he was going to share in
National Housing's profits.]
It was not until at least January 1984 that plaintiff,

-5-

for the first time, became aware of any relationship between
Mahmood, real estate agent Irene Woodside, Bara Investment, and
National Housing.

(R. 249)

At that time, William Chipman, an

investment officer for plaintiff, received a telephone call from
an appraiser named William Lang who told Mr. Chipman that the
subject property had been involved in a double escrow and that
there may have been an "irregularity" in the appraisal which
plaintiff relied on in purchasing the property.
suggested that Mr. Chipman call Reed Jensen.

Mr. Lang

(R. 249-251)

Shortly thereafter—within a couple of days—Mr. Chipman
did call Reed Jensen.

Mr. Jensen told Chipman that he was

involved in a lawsuit with Badi Mahmood, and confirmed that
National Housing had purchased the subject property and almost
immediately resold it to plaintiff at a much higher price, but
was otherwise hesitant to talk to Chipman without first consulting his attorney.
Near the end of January, 1984, Chipman called Jensen
back.

Jensen told Chipman that his attorney, Richard Rappaport,

had advised him not to turn over any documentation to Chipman
until Jensen's lawsuit with Mahmood was concluded.
called Mr. Rappaport.

Chipman then

Rappaport did not volunteer any

information, but did suggest that when the lawsuit against
Mahmood was concluded the transcript might provide material that
plaintiff might "desire to have".
28:3)

-6-

(Chipman deposition, 27:20-

Plaintiff obtained a copy of the transcript of proceedings in the case of Badi Mahmood v. R. Reed Jensen and Golden
Hills Land Corporation, Third Judicial District Court, Civil No.
C83-4217, in August and October, 1984. Based on testimony in
those transcripts, plaintiff and counsel determined there had
been what they believed to be fraudulent conduct on the part of
defendants.

Plaintiff filed its action on December 11, 1985,

less than two years after the telephone call from Lang to Chipman
first advising Chipman that there had been a double escrow and
that the property had been sold to plaintiff for three times the
price National Housing paid for it.
Plaintiff's Complaint (R. 2-11) alleged generally that
plaintiff purchased the subject property based on an appraisal
which misrepresented the value of the property at a much higher
value than its actual worth; that plaintiff did not know of the
erroneous nature of the appraisal; and that defendants each knew
that the property was worth much less than indicated by the
appraisal relied upon by plaintiff.

The Complaint also alleges

that the defendants conspired among themselves to conceal the
true value of the property from plaintiff.
On April 11, 1986, plaintiff file an Amended Complaint
(R. 80-91) which added four paragraphs alleging that plaintiff
"did not discover the misrepresentation and had no opportunity to
do so until sometime after January, 1984, when it began to be
apprised of the underlying facts . . .."

-7-

(Amended Complaint,

R. 80-91, II 23, 29, 37 and 45)
On March 22, 1987, plaintiff settled with Dale Jackman
and submitted an Order of Dismissal to the court dismissing
Jackman from the action.
On April 8, 1987, plaintiff filed its Motion for Leave
to Pile A Second Amended Complaint (R. 155-156) and Proposed
Second Amended Complaint.

(R. 157-170)

The Proposed Second

Amended Complaint added a new cause of action entitled Constructive Fraud (R. 166-169) alleging that defendants Mahmood, Irene
Woodside, and National Housing failed to disclose their true
relationship with each other when they knew a conflict of interest existed; that Mahmood failed to disclose that he had a controlling interest in Bara Investment; that Mahmood failed to
disclose that he had provided the appraiser, Dale Jackman, with
the real estate comparables used in the misleading appraisal
report; that Mahmood failed to disclose that the property had
been purchased just days earlier for one-third the value at which
Jackman appraised it; the double closing had not been disclosed
to plaintiff; and that Mahmood failed to disclose his own financial interest in the sale to plaintiff.

The proposed new cause

of action alleged that defendants knew that if plaintiff had
known of the facts which they failed to disclose, those facts
would have materially effected plaintiff's determination to purchase the property, and that Mahmood's failures to disclose material facts breached a duty owed to plaintiff pursuant to Utah

-8-

Code Ann. 61-2-11.

Plaintiff noticed its Motion for Leave to

File a Second Amended Complaint for hearing on April 27, 1987.
(R. 153)
On April 17, 1987, National Housing filed a memorandum
in opposition to plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File A Second
Amended Complaint (R. 172-176) and moved the court for summary
judgment in its favor.

(R. 177-178)

National Housing noticed

the summary judgment motion for hearing on April 27, the same day
as plaintiff's motion for leave to amend was set for hearing.
(R. 193)
The two motions were both argued on April 17, 1987, and
were taken under advisement.

(R. 196)

Thereafter, with the

trial court's permission, National Housing filed a Post Argument
Memorandum on Summary Judgment (R. 197-198), and plaintiff filed
a Reply Memorandum to Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to
Motion For Leave to File A Second Amended Complaint (R. 201-206)
and a Reply Memorandum in Opposition to [National Housing's]
Motion for Summary Judgment.

(R. 211-251).

Each of those memo-

randa were filed with the court by May 1, 1987.
By minute order dated May 13, 1987 (R. 269), the court
granted National Housing's summary judgment motion and, in light
of its ruling granting summary judgment, found plaintiff's Motion
for Leave to File A Second Amended Complaint moot.

The minute

order states that the summary judgment motion "is granted for the
reasons and upon the grounds advanced, however most specifically

-9-

on the ground that plaintiff relied on the appraisal of Mr,
Jackman who has been dismissed as a defendant."
Summary Judgment was entered in favor of National
Housing on June 8, 1987.

(R. 270-271)

Based on the trial

court's rulings as set forth in the May 13, 1987, minute order,
plaintiff and defendant Mahmood stipulated (R. 274-275) that his
summary judgment motion could be granted.4

Therefore, an order

granting judgment for Mahmood was entered on July 1, 1987.

(R.

272-273)
A default judgment was entered against the last remaining defendant, Irene Woodside, on September 23, 1987
(R. 294-295), and plaintiff filed its Notice of Appeal on October
5, 1987.

(R. 296-299)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
While it is surely within the trial court's discretion

whether to grant or deny a motion for leave to amend a complaint,
such motions should be freely granted when justice so requires.
Girard v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245 (Utah 1985).

In the instant

case, plaintiff filed its motion for leave to file a Second
Amended Complaint on April 8, 1987. Only thereafter, on April

4

Mahmood served a summary judgment motion on plaintiff, incorporating National Housing's arguments. The motion was apparently
never filed with the trial court [See Addendum].
-10-

17, 1987, did defendant National Housing file a motion for summary judgment.

The trial court erred when it failed to rule on

plaintiff's motion for leave to amend, but instead found the
motion moot because it was granting National Housing's summary
judgment motion.
The proposed Second Amended Complaint set forth a theory
of recovery against defendants Mahmood and National Housing not
encompassed within the Amended Complaint.

National Housing's

summary judgment motion did not present evidence sufficient to
eliminate each triable issue of material fact under the theory
set forth in the Sixth Cause of Action of plaintiff's proposed
Second Amended Complaint. (R. 166-169)

Plaintiff alleged in the

proposed Sixth Cause of Action that despite the appraisal work
Mahmood had performed for plaintiff in the past, resulting in a
relationship of trust and confidence between them, Mahmood failed
to advise plaintiff that he had a monetary interest in National
Housing's profit on the sale of the subject property, failed to
advise plaintiff that he controlled the brokerage firm handling
the sale, failed to advise plaintiff that he had provided the
comparable sales data to the appraiser who appraised the property
for plaintiff, and failed to tell plaintiff that the true value
of the property was much less than the appraised value.
Plaintiff contends that Mahmood's failure to advise it
of those material facts gave rise to a cause of action for that
species of constructive fraud known as misrepresentation by

-11-

omission, Sugarhouse Finance Co. v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369 (Utah
1980), and also gave rise to a cause of action against Mahmood
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-2-11(1) or (12) and 61-2-17, as
those statutes read at the time of the sale of the property.
Since plaintiff's motion for leave to amend was filed
before National Housing's summary judgment motion, plaintiff was
entitled to a ruling on its motion for leave to amend, either
granting or denying the motion, before ruling on the summary
judgment motion.
Plaintiff also contends that the finding by the trial
court set forth in its May 13, 1987, minute order (R.269) upon
which it based its order granting National Housing's summary
judgment motion—that "[plaintiff] relied on the appraisal of Mr.
Jackman who has been dismissed as a defendant"—is, even assuming
that to be a true and undisputed fact, an insufficient basis upon
which to grant summary judgment.

Assuming as fact that Mr.

Jackman did not submit a fraudulent appraisal does not preclude a
finding that Mahmood and National Housing conspired to defraud
plaintiff by providing Jackman with inaccurate or misleading
"comparable sales" data.

Nor does that fact preclude a finding

that Mahmood breached a duty to make a full disclosure to plaintiff of his relationship with National Housing and his financial
interest in National Housing's profit on the sale.

Nor does the

fact that plaintiff voluntarily dismissed Jackman raise any presumption that either he or any other defendant did not engage in

-12-

tortious conduct.
Finally, plaintiff submits that the statute of
limitations on its claims did not begin to run until at least
January, 1984, when plaintiff's employee William Chipman was
first advised that there may have been an irregularity in the
appraisal upon which plaintiff relied in going through with the
purchase of the subject property.

Utah Code Ann. §78-12-26(3)

provides that an action for relief on the ground of fraud or
mistake does not accrue until the discovery by the aggrieved
party of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake.

ARGUMENT
A.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT RULE ON PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
BEFORE RULING ON NATIONAL HOUSING'S
SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION
Plaintiff filed its Motion for Leave to File a Second
Amended Complaint (R. 155) on April 8, 1987. At that time there
were no other motions pending before the court.

The case had not

been set for trial and a Certificate of Readiness had not been
filed.

The record does not reflect that either of the respondent

defendants, National Housing and Badi Mahmood, had taken any
action on the case since October, 1986, when attorneys for
National Housing took the deposition of one of plaintiff's
employees.

Plaintiff noticed its motion for hearing on April 27,

1987. (R. 153)
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Nine days later, on April 17, 1987, National Housing
filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion for leave to amend
(R. 172) and a motion for summary judgment.

(R. 177)

National

Housing noticed its summary judgment motion for hearing on April
27, 1987 (R. 193), the same day as plaintiff's motion for leave
to amend was scheduled for hearing.

The memorandum in opposition

to the motion for leave to amend set forth an argument to the
effect that the motion should be denied because the proposed new
cause of action failed on its face to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted.

National Housing's memorandum in

support of its summary judgment motion did not address the
proposed new cause of action, which plaintiff entitled
"constructive fraud".
The two motions were both argued on April 27, 1987, and
taken under advisement by the trial court.

(R. 196)

After addi-

tional briefing by both sides, the trial court ruled as follows:
"1. [Plaintiff's] motion to amend is denied as moot in
light of the Courts following ruling.
"2. Motion for Summary Judgment of [defendant] National
Housing & Finance Syndicate is granted for the reasons and
upon the grounds advanced; however most specifically on the
ground that [plaintiff] relied on the appraisal of Mr.
Jackman who has been dismissed as a defendant. . . . "
(R. 269)
Plaintiff was entitled to a ruling on its Motion For
Leave to File Second Amended Complaint on the merits of the
motion and proposed Second Amended Complaint.

Plaintiff does not

contend for a rule that pending motions must, without exception,

-14-

be considered and ruled upon in the order they are filed.
However, in the instant case the proposed Second Amended
Complaint set forth a theory of recovery against defendants
Mahmood and National Housing not encompassed within the Amended
Complaint upon which the court granted summary judgment.
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, so far as it related to
National Housing and Mahmood, alleged generally that Mahmood knew
that the true value of the subject property was $320,000 but represented to plaintiff that the property had a value greater than
plaintiff was about to pay (R. 80, Amended Complaint, Second
Cause of Action); that National Housing made the same representation (Third Cause of Action); and that Mahmood and National
Housing conspired to defraud plaintiff by misrepresenting the
value of the property (Fifth Cause of Action).
In the course of discovery it became apparent that
plaintiff would not be able to prove any express misrepresentations by defendants Mahmood or National Housing as to the value
of the property.

Nevertheless, in view of what plaintiff per-

ceived to be a close relationship between its investment officers
and Mahmood based on real estate appraisal work performed for
plaintiff in the past by Mahmood, counsel concluded that Mahmood
had a professional duty as a real estate broker to disclose to
plaintiff that the property was worth substantially less than
plaintiff was about to pay for it.

Therefore, plaintiff moved

for leave to file a second amended complaint to allege a cause of

-15-

action for fraudulent concealment of material facts and for
breach of the duty of a licensed real estate broker as set forth
in Utah Code Ann. §61-2-11.
The merits of plaintiff's proposed new cause of action
are discussed in some detail later in this Argument.

It should

suffice at this juncture to point out that if plaintiff's motion
for leave to file the Second Amended Complaint had been granted,
plaintiff would not have carried the burden of showing reliance
on an express misrepresentation of material fact. A substantial
part of National Housing's summary judgment motion was based on
its Statement of Material Fact, found at R. 182, that "The only
representations relied upon by the Board in making its decision
to purchase the land in question were those contained in Dale
Jackman's appraisal", and its argument that, "Since Mr. Jackman's
appraisal was the only representation of value the Board relied
on in purchasing the subject land, the claims asserted in this
case fail at the threshold."

(R. 184)

Because proof of the new proposed cause of action did
not require evidence of an express misrepresentation, the trial
court should have ruled on the merits of plaintiff's motion for
leave to amend.
B.
HAD THE TRIAL COURT RULED ON THE MERITS OF PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
IT WOULD HAVE BEEN AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION NOT
TO GRANT THE MOTION
Leave to amend a pleading "shall be freely given when
justice so requires."

Rule 15(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
-16-

While it is certainly true that it is within the court's discretion whether to grant leave to amend a complaint, Stratford v.
Morgan, 689 P.2d 360, 365 (Utah 1984), in absence of evidence of
prejudice to the defendant or unless the proposed amendment will
delay trial, liberal application of Rule 15(a) requires that
leave be granted.

See, e.g., Girard v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245,

248 (Utah 1983); Thomas J. Peck & Sons, Inc. v. Lee Rock Products, Inc., 30 Utah 2d 187, 515 P.2d 446, 450 (1973); Gillman v.
Hansen, 26 Utah 2d 165, 486 P.2d 1045, 1046-1047 (1971).
A prime consideration in determining whether an amendment should be permitted is the adequacy of an opportunity to
meet the newly raised matter.
(Utah 1981).

Lewis v. Moultree, 627 P.2d 94, 98

In the instant case, National Housing made no

attempt to demonstrate that an order granting leave to further
amend the complaint would result in prejudice to it.

National

Housing made no claim that the proposed Second Amended Complaint
would require additional discovery although, as plaintiff pointed
out to the trial court (R. 202), further discovery was
contemplated.

The case was not on the eve of trial—indeed, no

trial date had yet been set.

Therefore, defendants had plenty of

opportunity to conduct discovery to prepare to meet the allegations contained in the proposed new cause of action.

The pro-

posed new cause of action certainly arose from the same "conduct,
transaction or occurrence" as alleged in the prior complaint.
Rule 15(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
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The only ground propounded by National Housing in support of
its argument that the motion for leave to amend should be denied
was that the proposed new cause of action did not state a claim
upon which relief could be based.

As is discussed below,

plaintiff submits that National Housing was wrong.
C.
PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION OF ITS SECOND
AMENDED COMPLAINT STATES A CLAIM FOR FRAUDULENT
CONCEALMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
The tort of concealment is a species of constructive
fraud.

As stated in Sugarhouse Finance Co. v. Anderson, 610 P.2d

1369 (Utah 1980) :
"A finding of fraud requires a showing of a false
representation of an existing material fact, made knowingly
or recklessly for the purpose of inducing reliance thereon
upon which plaintiff reasonably relies to his detriment.
Misrepresentation may be made . . . by material omission,
where there exists a duty to speak." (610 P.2d at 1373)
(emphasis added)
The proposed Second Amended Complaint alleges (or could
have been easily further amended to allege):
a.

Badi Mahmood had a lengthy business relationship

with plaintiff in that he had performed numerous real property appraisals for plaintiff in the past;
b.

Mahmood was the principal broker for Bara

Investment Corporation;
c.

Bara acted as the broker/agent for National Housing

in the sale of the subject property to plaintiff;
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d.

Mahmood also had a business interest in National

Housing, had a pecuniary interest in the sale, and in fact
received at least $100,000 of National Housing's profits from
the sale of the property to plaintiff;
e.

Mahmood knew the property had been sold to National

Housing for $320,000 just a few days before National Housing
sold the property to plaintiff for $927,000;
f.

Mahmood knew the fair market value of the property

was substantially less than $927,000;
g.

Mahmood recommended that plaintiff retain Dale

Jackman to appraise the property, and then provided Jackman
with comparable sales data used by Jackman in the appraisal
report.

Mahmood knew that use of the comparable sales data

would result in appraisal at a value higher than the actual
value.
h.

Plaintiff did not know, and Mahmood failed to dis-

close to plaintiff, that Mahmood controlled Bara Investments,
that he was going to personally take a percentage of National
Housing's profits, and that he knew the property was worth
substantially less than $927,000;
i.

Mahmood owed a duty to plaintiff, pursuant to Utah

-19-

Code Ann. § 61-2-11(12)5 to disclose his own financial
interest in the sale of the property; and
j.

Because of his prior business relationship with

plaintiff, Mahmood knew that if he had disclosed his interest
in the sale of the property to plaintiff, plaintiff would
have had the opportunity to ask him whether he believed the
price was reasonable, and whether he concurred with Dale
Jackman's appraisal of the property, in which case Mahmood
would have had a legal duty to speak the truth; and plaintiff
would have had the opportunity to obtain a second appraisal
from an appraiser not recommended by Mahmood.
In Utah, the rule of caveat emptor does not apply to
those dealing with a licensed real estate agent or broker, such
as Mahmood.

In Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1248 (Utah 1980),

this court stated:
"A real estate agent, however, does not occupy the position of lay vendor of property. An agent is licensed by the
state and is required to meet standards of 'honesty,
integrity, truthfulness, reputation, and competency.1 [U.C.A.

5

U.C.A. §61-2-11 lists several acts which the legislature has
determined constitute grounds for suspension or revocation of a
real estate broker's or salesman's license. Subdivision (11), in
1980 and presently, prohibits a broker or salesman from failing
to disclose whether a purchase or sale is made for himself or for
an undisclosed principal. Subdivision (12), as it read at the
time of the sale from National Housing to plaintiff, made it punishable for a broker or salesman to engage in "Any other conduct
whether of a similar or of a different character from that
hereinbefore specified which constitutes dishonest dealing".
Plaintiff submits that the conduct alleged is of a similar character to that conduct prohibited by §61-2-11(11).
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61-2-6(a)] A real estate license may be revoked if the licensee is unable or unworthy to safeguard the interests of the
public.
" . . . Though not occupying a fiduciary relationship
with prospective purchasers, a real estate agent hired by the
vendor is expected to be honest, ethical, and competent and
is answerable at law for breaches of his or her statutory
duty to the public." Idk_ at 1248.
Quoting from 23 Am.Jur. 854, Fraud and Deceit, IV
Concealment, Sections 78 and 80, in Elder v. Clawson, 14 Utah 2d
379, 384 P.2d 802, 804-805 (1963), this court stated:
"Silence, in order to be an actionable fraud, must
relate to a material matter known to the party and which it
is his legal duty to communicate to the other contracting
party, whether the duty arises from a relationship of trust,
from confidence, inequality of condition and knowledge, or
other attendant circumstances . . . .
"The principle is basic in the law of fraud as it
relates to nondisclosure that a charge of fraud is maintainable where a party who knows material facts is under a duty,
under the circumstances, to speak and disclose his information, but remains silent.
"Although the pertinent inquiry in any case where fraud
on the basis of nondisclosure is asserted is whether, upon
any particular occasion, it was the duty of the person to
speak on pain of being guilty of a fraud by reason of his
silence, except in broad terms the law does not attempt to
define the occasions when a duty to speak arises. On the
contrary, there has been adopted as a leading principle, the
proposition that whether a duty to speak exists is determinable by reference to all the circumstances of the case and by
comparing the facts not disclosed with the object and end in
view by the contracting parties. . . .
"Knowledge that the other party to a contemplated transaction is acting under a mistaken belief as to certain facts
is a factor in determining that a duty of disclosure is
owing. There is much authority to the effect that if one
party to a contract or transaction has superior knowledge, or
knowledge which is not within the fair and reasonable reach
of the other party and which he could not discover by the
exercise of reasonable diligence, or means of knowledge which
are not open to both parties alike, he is under a legal obligation to speak, especially when the other party relies upon
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him to communicate to him the true state of facts to enable
him to judge of the expediency of the bargain."
In the instant case, the "circumstances" upon which a
duty to speak must be determined are those set forth above. By
reason of his controlling interest in Bara Investment Company
Mahmood was, unbeknownst to plaintiff, an agent for National
Housing.

Not only did Mahmoodfs ongoing business relationship

with plaintiff give rise to a duty to divulge his interest in the
sale, i.e., that he controlled the brokerage company which was
going to receive a commission on the sale and was personally
going to share in National Housing1s profit on the sale.

Mahmood

also had an statutory obligation as a real estate broker to
divulge his interest in the sale.

U.C.A. §61-2-11(12).

If

Mahmood had done so then plaintiff, based on Mahmoodfs past work
as an appraiser for plaintiff, might have had the opportunity to
inquire of Mahmood as to the reasonableness of the price it was
going to pay for the property.

If asked, Mahmood would have had

a legal obligation to speak the truth.

Because of Mahmoodfs

failure to disclose his interest in both the commission and net
profit, plaintiff never had that opportunity.6

6

It does not take much speculation to conclude that if plaintiff
had known of Mahmoodfs interest in the property, it would have at
least casually asked him what he thought of the price National
Housing was asking. Nor does it take much speculation to conclude that if plaintiff had known of Mahmoodfs interest it would
have obtained a second appraisal of the property by an appraiser
not recommended by Mahmood, as was the case.
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Plaintiff submits that proof of the facts alleged above,
all of which are explicitly or inferentially found in the proposed new cause of action of plaintiff's Second Amended
Complaint, when coupled with Mahmood's ethical duty as set forth
in U.C.A. §61-2-11(1), (11), and (12), would establish a case
upon which the trier of fact could find constructive fraud.
Whether a relationship between two parties is sufficiently
"confidential" as to create a duty on the part of the defendant
to come forward and disclose all the material facts to the
plaintiff is a question of fact.

Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d

766, 769 (Utah 1985) .
D.
PLAINTIFF'S DISMISSAL OF DALE JACKMAN DOES NOT PRECLUDE
A FINDING OF CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD ON THE PART OF
DEFENDANTS MAHMOOD OR NATIONAL HOUSING
As stated above, the trial court's minute order states
that it granted National Housing's summary judgment motion "for
the reasons and upon the grounds advanced [by National Housing];
however most specifically on the ground that [plaintiff] relied
on the appraisal of Mr. Jackman who has been dismissed as a
defendant." (R. 269)
Plaintiff did indeed settle with and dismiss its claim
against the appraiser, Dale Jackman, and in doing so it expressly
reserved its claims against each of the other defendants.
150-151)

(R.

However, the release of one joint tortfeasor does not

discharge other joint tortfeasors when, as in this case, the
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plaintiff has expressly reserved his rights.
15-4-4.

Utah Code Ann,

The trial court erred when it let its decision to grant

National Housing's summary judgment motion be influenced by the
fact that plaintiff dismissed the appraiser who prepared the
appraisal upon which plaintiff relied in purchasing the property
at an inflated price.

Even assuming that Dale Jackman was dis-

missed because plaintiff became convinced of his lack of
culpability, that lack of culpability does not give rise to any
presumption that defendants Mahmood and National Housing were not
culpable.
No evidence was presented by National Housing in support
of its summary judgment that would preclude a finding that
Jackman, whether himself culpable or not, served as a conduit for
Mahmoodfs fraudulent scheme because he unwittingly used inappropriate comparable sales data provided by Mahmood in his appraisal
of the subject property.
Plaintiff did present evidence in opposition to the summary judgment motion which raised an issue as to whether Mahmood
provided comparable sales data to Jackman.

When questioned dur-

ing the trial of the case entitled Mahmood v. Jensen, Mahmood
testified that he "assisted Mr. Jackman, much to my recollection,
in—and some of the market data that I had in my file."
(R. 245-246)
In that same case, Galen Ross, an officer of National
Housing, testified that National Housing paid Mahmood approxi-
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mately $200,000 of National Housing's profits on the sale and
that Mahmood gave Ross 50% of what National Housing paid him,
(R. 242-24 3) That evidence certainly creates a triable issue of
material fact as to whether a civil conspiracy existed between
Mahmood and National Housing, acting through its officers. See,
Israel Pagan Estate v. Cannon, 746 P.2d 785, 790 (Utah App. 1987).
E.
A FINDING OF CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD ON THE PART OF DEFENDANTS
MAHMOOD AND NATIONAL HOUSING WAS NOT PRECLUDED BY THE
INTRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE THAT THE PROPERTY DECLINED
IN VALUE AFTER THE SALE TO PLAINTIFF
A substantial portion of National Housing's memorandum
in support of its summary judgment motion, and supporting
evidence, was devoted to showing that extraneous factors caused
the value of the subject property to fall subsequent to its sale
to plaintiff.

National Housing argued, first, that in 1981 Salt

Lake County enacted the "Salt Lake County Hillside Ordinance"
which resulted in a portion of the property being unavailable for
development, thereby decreasing the value of the property.
Second, National Housing argued that "following the sale, real
estate values in general fell." (R. 181)
Assuming those arguments to be valid does not preclude
a finding that Mahmood and National Housing defrauded plaintiff
by failing to disclose material facts which they had a duty to
disclose, disclosure of which would have influenced plaintiff's
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decision to purchase the property at the price actually paid.
Proof of those facts may cause the trier of fact to conclude that
plaintiff's damages are less, perhaps even grossly less, than
plaintiff claims.

But even irrefutable evidence that the value

of the property dropped after the sale to plaintiff does not preclude as a matter of law the possibility that Mahmood defrauded
plaintiff by failing to disclose his business interest in Bara
Investment Corporation, that he was going to share in National
Housing's profits from the sale, that he had provided misleading
comparable sales data to Jackman, and that he knew the property
was worth less than plaintiff was going to pay.
For example, assume that when National Housing paid
$320,000 for the property and resold it to plaintiff for $927,000
it in fact had a fair market value of $917,000.

If plaintiff can

prove the allegations of the sixth cause of action of its
proposed Second Amended Complaint, as detailed in paragraphs (a)
through (j) on pages 18 through 20 of this brief, then plaintiff
would still have sustained damages of $10,000 by reason of
Mahmoodfs fraud; the difference between the price actually paid
for the property and the price plaintiff would have been willing
to pay had Mahmood disclosed all the material facts.

See, Lynch

v. McDonald, 12 Utah 2d 427, 367 P.2d 464, 470 (1962); Dugan v.
Jones, supra, 615 P.2d 1239, 1247.
In short, the probative effect of the evidence presented
by National Housing that the value of the property fell after the
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sale goes only to the amount of damages sustained by plaintiff,
but is irrelevant to the question of whether defendants committed
a fraud.
P.
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IS NOT A BAR TO
PLAINTIFF'S ACTION
Neither side disputes that Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26(3)
sets forth the applicable statute of limitations on plaintiff's
claims of fraud.

That section states:

"Within three years:
"(3) an action for relief on the ground of fraud or
mistake; except that the cause of action does not accrue
until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake."
Discovery by the aggrieved party occurs when the fraud
is discovered by the injured person, Esponda v. Ogden State Bank,
75 Utah 117, 283 P. 729, 731 (1929), or perhaps when facts arise
which would put a reasonably prudent person on notice to inquire
into the matter.
1984).

See, Haslem v. Ottosen, 689 P.2d 27, 30 (Utah

Whichever the standard, the time of "discovery" of fraud

is a question of fact.

Horn v. Daniel, 315 F.2d 471 (10th Cir.

1962) .
In the instant case, National Housing argued to the
trial court that plaintiff should have been put on notice to
inquire when two years after the purchase of the property, in
January 1982, plaintiff had the property appraised and the
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appraisal showed the land to be worth $510,000, just 55% of the
purchase price, National Housing argued that "such an enormous
difference between price and appraised value would certainly
place a reasonably prudent person on notice to inquire into the
matter-" (R. 188)
National Housing's argument might have some credibility
were it not for the evidence, propounded by National Housing,
that subsequent to plaintiff's purchase of the property the property sustained a loss of value due to (1) enactment of the "Salt
Lake County Hillside Ordinance", precluding construction on
slopes exceeding a 40% grade, and (2) a general decline in the
value of real estate in the years immediately following the
purchase-

If National Housing's contentions in that regard are

true, there is no reason why plaintiff should have been placed on
notice that a fraud may have been perpetrated merely by reason of
a drop in the value of the property.
In response to National Housing's summary judgment
motion, plaintiff presented evidence (R. 249-251) that it did not
have notice of possible fraudulent conduct until at least January
1984 when William P. Chipman, an investment officer in
plaintiff's Real Estate Department, first learned that Mahmood
and National Housing had participated in a "double closing" and
subsequently received copies of portions of transcripts of testimony of Mahmood and National Housing officer Galen Ross given in
the trial of Mahmood v. Jensen, Civil No. C83-4217.
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Those tran-

scripts were not received until August and October, 1984.

It was

only after review of those transcripts that plaintiff had any
knowledge whatsoever that it may have been victimized by Mahmood
and National Housing.

Plaintiff's original Complaint was filed

on December 11, 1985, well within three years of January 1984.7
The evidence presented was sufficient to create a
triable issue of material fact as to when facts constituting the
fraud were or should have been discovered, thus triggering the
limitation period for an action based on fraud.

While the trial

court's minute order granting the summary judgment motion (R.
269) does not specifically address the statute of limitation
issue, if the Court found as a matter of law that the limitation
period had expired, then it erred in so finding.
CONCLUSION
Based on all of the above, and on the record below,
plaintiff respectfully submits that the trial court erred when it
granted summary judgment in favor of defendant National Housing.
Based on the trial court's minute order granting the summary
judgment motion, it would have been futile to oppose the summary
judgment motion served on plaintiff by defendant Mahmood which

7

Plaintiff does not anticipate any argument that the proposed
Second Amended Complaint, had it been allowed, would not have
related back to the date of filing of the original Complaint.
The proposed Second Amended Complaint added no new parties and
the proposed new cause of action "arose out of the conduct,
transaction, or occurrence set forth...in the original pleading."
Rule 15(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
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incorporated National Housing's arguments [see Footnote 4,
supra]
Plaintiff Utah State Retirement Board submits that the
judgments in favor of defendants National Housing and Badi
Mahmood should be reversed and the case should be remanded to the
trial court for trial.
Plaintiff should be awarded its costs on appeal.
DATED this ^A

day of February, 1988.
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT

yj&A^y^^

Bv;

Craig T. Vincefit,
Henry S. Nygaard,
Steven H. Lybbert, Attorneys
for Plaintiff-Appellant
Utah State Retirement Board
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ADDENDUM
Proposed Second Amended Complaint (R. 157-170)
May 13, 1987 Minute Order (R. 269)
Judgment [in favor of National Housing] (R. 270-271)
Motion for Summary Judgment [by Badi Mahmood] (not filed)
Order [summary judgment in favor of Mahmood] (R. 272)
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CRAIG T. VINCENT, ESQ. #3334
HENRY S. NYGAARD, ESQ. #2435
BEASLIN, NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT
Attorneys for Plaintiff
333 North 300 West Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
Telephone: (801) 328-2506
MARK A. MADSEN, ESQ. #2051
Attorney for Plaintiff
540 East 200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD,
Plaintiff,

:
:

vs.

:

BADI MAHMOOD, IRENE WOODSIDE,
DALE JACKMAN, NATIONAL HOUSING
AND FINANCE SYNDICATE, and
DOES 1 through 10,

:

PROPOSED
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

:

Civil No. C85-8322

:

Judge:

James S. Sawaya

Defendants.

Plaintiff complains of defendants and for cause of
action alleges:
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
1.

That plaintiff is an agency of the State of Utah

created pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 49-9-1 et. seq. with its
principal offices located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
2.

That defendant Badi Mahmood ("Mahmood") is and was
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at all times referred to hereafter, a licensed real estate broker
and appraiser residing in and doing business in Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, and is and was the principal broker for defendant
Bara Investment Corporation.
3.

That defendant Irene Woodside ("Woodside") was at

all times referred to hereafter a licensed real estate agent
employed by or otherwise associated with defendant Bara Investment
Corporation.
4.

That Dale Jackman (wJackman") is and was at all

times referred to hereafter a real estate appraiser doing business
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
5.

That defendant Bara Investment Corporation

("Bara")

is a Utah corporation, with its principal place of business in
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, which was involuntarily dissolved
for failure to pay taxes on September 30, 1984.
6.

That defendant National Housing and Finance

Syndicate ("National Housing") is a Utah corporation with its
principal place of business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
7.

That defendants Does 1 through 10 are individuals or

entities not yet identified by plaintiff, but which were involved
in the transaction which is the basis of this lawsuit, and which
plaintiff intends to identify through discovery.
8.

That this lawsuit arises out of a sale of real pro-

perty ("the real property") consisting of approximately forty-six
(46) acres located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, more speci-2-

fically described as follows:
BEGINNING at a point which is 1004.27 feet West,
more or less, to a point on the East line of Lot
38, GOLDEN HILLS NO. 14, and South 22*10' West
179.16 feet from the calculated center of Section
1, Township 3 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base
and Meridian; and running thence South 70Ml 1 East
1549.04 feet, along a line being Southerly 109.88
feet and parallel to the Northerly line of Blue
Jay Mining Claim No. 4988; thence North 16MO 1
East 744.19 feet, along said Easterly line and
along the Easterly line of the Shaffer Mining
Claim No. 3038, to the Northeasterly corner of the
Shaffer Mining Claim No. 3038; thence North 75#37f
West 621.95 feet along the Northerly line of said
claim to a point on the center line of said
Section 1, Township 3 South, Range 1 East, thence
North 0*17f23" East 303.74 feet along said center
line to a point of intersection with the Southerly
line of the Repeat Mining Claim No. 4341; thence
North 18•00' East 621.39 feet along said line to
the most Easterly corner of said mining claim;
thence North 53*34' West 234.08 feet along the
North line of said Repeat Mining claim No. 4341 to
a point of intersection with the center line of
said section; thence North 0*17'23" East 84.93
feet along said center line; thence along the
Southerly line of Golden Hills Canyon, the
following 6 courses; North 75* West 87.22 feet;
thence North 85* West 232.19 feet; thence South
58* West 131.75 feet; thence North 75*04f53" West
227.68 feet; thence Southwesterly along a 149.984
foot radius curve to the right through a central
angle of 68*04f53" a distance of 178.22 feet;
thence South 83" West 61.20 feet to a point on the
East line of Golden Hills No. 7, a subdivision;
thence South 7* East 187.28 feet along said East
side; thence South 27* West 331.437 feet; thence
South 63" East 24.476 feet; thence South 27* West
130.0 feet; thence North 63" West 37.14 feet;
thence South 13#10' East 372.63 feet; thence South
along the East line of Lot 40, Golden Hills No. 14
112.59 feet; thence South 22-10' West 346.47 feet
to the point of BEGINNING.
SUBJECT TO and together with the following
described 66 foot right of way over and across the
South line of the property described above, which
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right of way is not to limit ingress and egress to
either party which is a part of this agreement
herewith heirs or assigns and successors in
interest until such time as access is established
of record between the parties hereto.
It is further agreed that access shall be
established from a street known as Kings Hill
Drive.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION
9.

Plaintiff realleges the allegations of paragraphs 1

through 8 and incorporates the same herein.
10.

That plaintiff and National Housing entered into an

Earnest Money Contract for the purchase of the real property
described in paragraph 8 above, on December 18, 1979, a copy of
which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein.
11.

That National Housing's interest in the property at

the time of the contract was limited to an option to purchase the
same.
12.

That National Housing exercised its option and

purchased the property on January 2, 1980, for the amount of
$320,000.00, which amount represents the actual value of the property at that time, and defendant National Housing closed the sale
to the plaintiff on that same day for an amount of $927,819.00
($20,000.00 per acre), thereby realizing an instantaneous gain of
$607,819.00.
13.

That the purchase price agreed to by the plaintiff

was based on an appraisal done by Jackman, which value was erro-
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neous.
14.

That plaintiff did not know of the erroneous nature

of the appraisal.
15.

That National Housing knew of the erroneous nature

of the appraisal, and further knew that plaintiff did not know
of the erroneous nature of the appraisal.
16.

That National Housing had a duty to inform the

plaintiff of its interest in the land and the nature and extent of
the mistake.
17.

That National Housing knew or should have known that

plaintiff relied upon the erroneous appraisal and the integrity of
the defendant National Housing to be fair and honest in its business dealings.
18.

That as a direct result of plaintiff's mistake and

National Housing's knowledge thereof, plaintiff has been damaged
in the amount of $607,819.00.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
MISREPRESENTATION
19.

Plaintiff realleges the allegations of paragraphs 1

through 18 and incorporates the same herein.
20.

The defendants Mahmoodf Woodside and Bara were bro-

kers/agents in the sale from National Housing to plaintiff, and
were instrumental in arranging and negotiating the sale, and that
because of their legal relationships of principal and agent, each
is liable for the acts of the other.
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21.

Plaintiff arranged for an appraisal from Jackman but

unknown to plaintiff, Mahmood dealt directly with Jackman and
either supplied Jackman with the comparables relied upon in said
appraisal, or actually drafted the appraisal for Jackman, and
Mahmood was therefore instrumental in arriving at the erroneous
value stated in the appraisal.
22.

That Mahmood, Woodside and Bara misrepresented the

value of the property to the plaintiff and that said misrepresentation constitutes a misrepresentation of a material fact.
23.

That Mahmood, Woodside and Bara knew of National

Housing's opportunity to purchase the property for $320,000.00,
and further knew that $320,000.00 constituted the fair market
value of the property at the time of the sale to plaintiff.
24.

That the misrepresentation was made with the intent

to deceive plaintiff as to the value of the property and induce
plaintiff to act thereon.
25.

That plaintiff did not discover the misrepresen-

tation and had no reasonable opportunity to do so until some time
after January, 1984, when it began to be apprised of the
underlying facts alleged herein.
26.

That plaintiff justifiably relied on the misrepre-

sentation and as a result of plaintiff's reliance, plaintiff has
been damaged in the amount of $607,819.00.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
MISREPRESENTATION AND FRAUD
27.

Plaintiff realleges the allegations of paragraphs 1
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through 26 and incorporates the same herein.
28.

That National Housing, by and through its agents and

officers, misrepresented the value of the property to plaintiff,
and that said misrepresentation constitutes a misrepresentation of
a material fact.
29.

That National Housing knew the value of the property

was $320,000.00.
30.

That the misrepresentation was made with the intent

to deceive plaintiff and induce plaintiff to act thereon.
31.

That plaintiff did not discover the misrepresen-

tation and had no reasonable opportunity to do so until some time
after January, 1984, when it began to be apprised of the
underlying facts alleged herein.
32.

That plaintiff justifiably relied on the misrepre-

sentation and as a result of plaintifffs reliance, plaintiff has
been damaged in the amount of $607,819.00.
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
MISREPRESENTATION AND FRAUD
33.

Plaintiff realleges the allegations of paragraphs 1

through 32 and incorporates the same herein.
34.

That Jackman misrepresented the value of the pro-

perty to the plaintiff, and that said misrepresentation constitutes a misrepresentation of a material fact.
35.

That the value of the property arrived at by Jackman
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was based either on comparables supplied to Jackman by Mahmood
which were not accurate comparables, or on a completed appraisal
submitted to Jackman by Mahmood for signature only, and that
Jackman failed to accurately and independently conduct his own
research.
36.

That Jackman knew of the purchase by National

Housing of the property for $320,000.00, but failed to disclose
the same.
37.

That Jackmanfs representation of the value of the

property at $950,000.00 was made either with intent to defraud the
plaintiff, or was recklessly made.
38.

That Jackman knew that plaintiff would rely on the

appraisal, and the value stated therein.
39.

That plaintiff did not discover the misrepresen-

tation and had no reasonable opportunity to do so until some time
after January, 1984, when it began to be apprised of the
underlying facts alleged herein.
40.

That plaintiff justifiably relied on the value of

the property as represented by the appraisal and as a result of
plaintiff's reliance, plaintiff has been damaged in the amount of
$607,819.00.
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
CONSPIRACY
41.

Plaintiff realleges the allegations of paragraphs 1

through 40 and incorporates the same herein.
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42.

That each of the defendants knew the value of the

property at the time of sale to the plaintiff was $320,000.00.
43.

That the defendants conspired and acted in concert

to defraud the plaintiff as to the value of the property, and
thereby cause injury to the plaintiff.
44.

That the defendants overtly carried out their

conspiracy by concealing the true nature of National Housing's
interest in the property, by concealing the true value of the property, by providing a misleading and erroneous appraisal, by concealing Mahmoodfs interest in Bara Investment, and by
misrepresenting the value of the property to the plaintiff.
45.

That the conspiracy referred to in paragraph 43,

combined with the acts referred to in paragraph 44, defrauded the
plaintiff causing injury to the plaintiff in the amount of
$607,819.00.
46.

That after receiving the cash sale proceeds from the

plaintiff, National Housing paid Mahmood $200,000.00 for his part
in the conspiracy, and Mahmood in turn paid an individual officer
of National Housing $100,000.00.
47.

That plaintiff did not discover the conspiracy to

defraud and had no reasonable opportunity to do so until some time
after January, 1984, when it began to be apprised of the
underlying facts alleged herein.
48.

As a direct result of the defendants' conspiratorial

acts, the plaintiff was damaged in the sum of $607,819.00.
-9-

SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION
CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD
49.

Plaintiff realleges the allegations of paragraphs 1

through 48 and incorporates the same herein.
50.

Defendants Mahmood, Woodside and National Housing

committed constructive fraud upon the plaintiff:
a.

The defendants failed to disclose their true

relationship with each other when they each knew that a
conflict of interest existed and that as a direct result
of said relationship and conflict of interest coupled
with their unique knowledge concerning the transaction
in question, that they were not entitled to the
unconscionable profit realized from the transaction.
b.

Mahmood failed to disclose that he had a

controlling interest in Bara Investment, the brokerage
firm that handled this sales transaction.
o.

Mahmood failed to disclose that at the time he

recommended that Dale Jackman appraise the property in
question, that he or his agent Woodside, through Bara
Investment, he provided the real estate comparable to
other information to Jackman which resulted in an erroneous and accessibly high appraisal.
d.

That the party defendants acted in concert to

defraud the plaintiff and obtain an unreasonable and
unconscionable profit by closing the real estate tran-10-

saction between National Housing and Golden Hills Land
Corporation at Associated Title on the 2nd day of
January, 1980, and January 3, 1980, executed a resale of
said property from National Housing to the plaintiff.
Said double closing was never disclosed to the plaintiff.
e.

The conflict of interest is in direct violation

of i 61-2-11(1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 11, 16, & 17), Utah Code
Annotated (1953) as amended.
f.

Subsequent to the transaction, Mahmood falsely

represented that his brokerage company did not handle
the transaction and that the sale was the result of a
direct negotiation between National Housing and counsel
for plaintiff.
g.

At the time the Earnest Money Contract dated

December 18, 1979, was executed, Irene Woodside signed
as a real estate agent for Bara Investment; no disclosure was made that Mahmood controlled Bara Investment.
h.

The defendants failed to disclose that Mahmood

had a personal and business interest in National Housing
and that they, by prior arrangement, acted in concert to
resell said land to the plaintiff and then agreeing to
divide their unconscionable profit among themselves;
National Housing and Mahmood knowingly used Mahmood1s
close personal and business connections with the plain-11-

tiff to secure said profit at the plaintiff's expense,
i.

The defendants failed to disclose that they each

had actual knowledge of the market value of said property and actually saw the Jackman appraisal before the
December 18, 1979, Earnest Money Agreement was executed,
j.

Their representations were false.

k.

Their representations or omissions concerned a

presently existing material facts*
1,

Their representations and/or omissions to

disclose material facts were made to induce plaintiff to
execute the contracts consummating the transaction.
m.

Plaintiff acted reasonably and in ignorance of

the falsity of their representations and/or omissions.
n.

The defendants had a duty to disclose all of the

material facts and possible conflicts of interest before
the transactions were consummated on or about the 2nd
day of January, 1980, knowing the plaintiff had no
knowledge of the true facts and was relying upon the
representations (or failure to disclose information) of
the defendants.
o.

Plaintiff relied upon the defendants1 represen-

tations or omissions in executing the contracts.
p.

Plaintiff suffered damages as a direct result of

the fraudulent acts and omissions of the defendants.

-12-

SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
51.

Plaintiff realleges the allegations of paragraphs 1

through 50 and incorporates the same herein.
52.

That the above-described conduct of the defendants

was intentional, wilful, and malicious.
53.

That the defendants knew that their conduct would

result in substantial harm to the plaintiff, and said conduct was
done with reckless indifference and disregard of plaintiff's
rights.
54.

That plaintiff is, therefore, entitled to punitive

damages in the amount of $1,200,000.00.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays for a judgment against defendants and each of them in the amount of $607,819.00 together with
punitive damages in the amount of $1,200,000.00, interest, costs
of court, attorney's fees and such other relief as the court deems
just.
DATED this

day of

, 1987.

NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT

Henry S. Nygaard
Attorney for Plaintiff

Mark A. Madsen
Attorney for Plaintiff
Plaintiff's Address:
540 East 200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah

84102
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Gordon Campbell, A0554
Mark L. Mathie, A4880
FABIAN & CLENDENIN,
A Professional Corporation
Twelfth Floor
215 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-8900
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD,
Plaintiff,

)

V.

)

BADI MAHMOOD, IRENE WOODSIDE,
DALE JACKMAN, BARA INVESTMENT
CORPORATION, NATIONAL HOUSING
AND FINANCE SYNDICATE, and
JOHN DOES 1 through 10,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Defendants.

JUDGMENT

Civil No. C85-8322

Judge James S. Sawaya

On May 13, 1987, the Court heard argument on defendant
National Housing and Finance Syndicate's Motion for Summary
Judgment and plaintiff's motion to file its second amended
complaint.

The Court, having reviewed the motions, memoranda and

all supporting documents, and being fully advised of the matters
at issue and good cause appearing therefor
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that
defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted and
plaintiff's action against it is dismissed with prejudice.

0oo<'°

plaintiff's Motion to File Its Second Amended Complaint is denied
for the reason that the Motion is moot in light of the Court's
ruling on the aforementioned Motion for Summary Judgment.
DATED this

/)

day of June^l^87.

ATTEST

( / * yCfar^.

H. DIXON HINDLEV-.

\

^

^

— —

Q I ^ District- Judge
Uy—J*UA ^ry /v I

/ v

f\

CERTIPI^i^Q^ SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this <~>VAv"

day of June 1987,

I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing Judgment to be
mailed, postage prepaid, to:
Craig T. Vincent, Esq.
Henry S. Nygaard, Esq.
Beaslin, Nygaard, Coke & Vincent
333 North 300 West Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
Mark A. Madsen, Esq.
540 East 200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah

84102

Brant Wall, Esq.
Wall & Wall
9 Exchange Place
Suite 900, Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Lowell V. Summerhays, Esq.
Tamara J. Hauge, Esq.
420 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
V ^ VyCXrvvvxJU
GWC:052787B
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§TAT*0PUT*f
)m
COUNTY Of SALT U K E ) * *
I, ?W| UWBWMGNgD. CLERK OF THE DtSTRJCT
eouar OF S ^ T LAKE COUNTY, UTAH, DO HEREBY
CERTIFY THA* THE ANNEXED AND FOREGOING 13
A TRUE AND FULL COPY OF AN ORIGINAL DOCUMENT ON FILE \H MY OFFICE AS SUCH CLERK
WITNESS MY HAND AND^SEA^OF SAID COURT
THIS ? * DAY OF
(V***
19 JjjL^rl^
H DIXON, HINDJ.EY, CLERK
,Q U v J *%'
BY
A r v ^ l ^ u ^ g AA-A.^
DEPUTY

BRANT H. WALL, NO, 3364
WALL & WALL, a.p.c.
Attorney for
Suite 800 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
^Telephone: (801) 521-8220
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
(UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD,
Plaintiff,

MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
IBADI MAHMOOD, IRENE WOODSIDE,
DALE JACKMAN, NATIONAL HOUSING
RND FINANCE SYNDICATE, and
pOES 1 THROUGH X,

Civil No. C-85-8322
HONORABLE JAMES S. SAWAYA

Defendants•
)

COMES NOW the Defendant Badi Mahmood, pursuant to Rule 56,
btah Rules of Civil Procedure, and hereby moves the Court fori
Summary Judgment and that this action be dismissed for the reason
that there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the!
Defendant Badi Mahmood is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
This Motion is based upon the pleadings on file, the depositions of|
Russell

Hales

and

William

Chipman

and

the

exhibits

attached]

thereto.
Defendant adopts by reference the Memorandum of Points and|
Authorities heretofore filed by the Defendant National Housing and|
Finance Syndicate, together with the arguments previously presented
to the Court pursuant to the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by
M.MAPC)
'S AT LAW
TON BUILDING
TV UT 8 4 m
•18220

-2-

|said National Housing and Finance Syndicate in which this Defendant
(participated.
DATED this

//)

day of June, 1987

NT H . WALtr
torney for Defendant Mahmood
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

HENRY S. NYGAARD
Attorney for Plaintiff
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the)
[foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following persons,]
|this ^Q^)^day of June, 1987:
Henry S. Nygaard
Attorney at Law
330 North 300 West
Salt Lake City, Utah

84103

Mark A. Madsen
Attorney at Law
540 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah

84102

Gordon Campbell
Attorney at Law
215 South State, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Lowell V. Summerhays
Attorney at Law
420 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Secretary to Brant H. Wall
l WALL (A P C )
*NEYS AT LAW
BOSTON BUILDING
£ CITY UT 84111
1)521 8220

JAttorney for Defendant Mahmood
Suite 800 Boston Building
Bait Lake City, Utah 84111
telephone: (801) 521-8220
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JJTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD,
Plaintiff,
vs.

ORDER

bADI MAHMOOD, IRENE WOODSIDE,
DALE JACKMAN, NATIONAL HOUSING
AND FINANCE SYNDICATE, and
pOES 1 THROUGH X,

Civil No. C-85-8322
HONORABLE JAMES S. SAWAYA

Defendants.
)

BASED UPON Stipulation dated June 30, 1987, by and between
bounsel for the Plaintiff and the Defendant Badi Mahmood, and thej
Motion of counsel for the Defendant Badi Mahmood dated June 18,
p.987, and the Court having duly considered the record and all
matters referred

to in said Stipulation, and being thus fully)

(advised in the premises,
DOES HEREBY ORDER, ADJUDGE, AND DECREE that Defendant Badi
Mahmood's

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment

is

hereby

granted

andj

plaintiff's action against him is dismissed with prejudice.
IT

IS

FURTHER

ORDERED,

ADJUDGED,

AND

DECREED

that

plaintiff's Motion to File Its Second Amended Complaint is denied
tor the reason that the Motion is moot in light of the Court's!
ALL (A PC)
Y$ AT LAW

(ruling on the aforementioned Motion for Summary Judgment.

;TON BUILCXNG
ITY UT 84111
?1 8220

000*'*'

DATED this / ^

day of July, 1987.
BY THE COURT:

DIstRlCT COURT JUDGE
APPROVED AS TO FORM
AND CONTENT:

^

ATTEST
H. OIXON HII

k.* fAtf^

TsTTr?
HENRYi/S.
NYGAARD
Attorney for Plaintiff
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
This

to

certify

that

a

true

and

correct

copy of the

[foregoing Order was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following named
persons this

day of July, 1987:

Mr. Mark A. Madsen
Attorney at Law
540 East 200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah

84102

Mr. Lowell V. Summerhays
Attorney at Law
420 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Mr. Gordon Campbell
Attorney at Law
215 South State, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Secretary to Brant H. Wall

WALL & WALL (A P C )
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
E 600 BOSTON BUILDING
.T LAKE CITY UT 84111
(801) S21 6220

ooo*tf

CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on the 5 ^

day of February, 1988,

I personally hand delivered copies of APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF
in the case of Utah State Retirement Board v. Badi Mahmood and
National Housing and Finance Syndicate, Case No. 870375, to the
following:

Brant H. Wall
Wall & Wall
Suite 800 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

(4 copies)

Warren Patten
Mark L. Mathie
Fabian & Clendenin
Twelfth Floor
215 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

(4 copies)

/Jfitni\l«hii
Steven H. Lyobert

f-

